(xiv) On 6 October Terry
Collins wrote to Barry Reamsbottom to complain about the manner
in which the design assistant post interviews had been organised
by Joan Easton, and Ms Stansfield also wrote to Mr Reamsbottom raising
a formal grievance against her. Among a long list of complaints
about Miss Easton's working methods Ms Stansfield referred to the
following:
1. Joan showed
bias in her attitude to both myself and the validity of Nikola's
complaint
2. Joan sought
to deliberately mislead me about the matter of a claim to an
employment tribunal
3. To date
she has made no report to Jim McAuslan about her investigation,
in direct contradiction of her own memorandum
4. Her behaviour
throughout this matter has been such as to cause me untold and
unnecessary stress."
(xv) On the following day she also sent a long memorandum to Joan
Easton addressing various aspects of Miss Easton's memorandum of
3 September. She accused Miss Easton of (a) misleading her on both
the issues which she raised with her, (b) attempting to rewrite
the history of their meeting on 31 August, (c) failing to understand
and appreciate the work which a design assistant does, and (d) saying
one thing and doing another. She ended her memorandum as follows:
"Finally
I cannot allow you to change the basic nature of my original
correspondence. The issue at hand is not whether I am disappointed
about not being involved in the appointment of the design assistant.
That is entirely irrelevant.
Had I believed
that your action were based on an equality of practice in relation
to myself as against others you would not have heard a word
from me, other than to support your decision. Had you told me
the truth on the occasions that we met over this affair, you
would not have heard a word from me. The only reason we are
in correspondence is that I require from you full and proper
explanations for the contradictions in your words and actions
in these matters."
(xvi) Miss Easton acknowledged Ms Stansfield's memorandum only briefly,
by memo dated 12 October, in which she informed her that she had
nothing more to add to her memo of 3 September and continued:
"I
trust that, despite your feelings about the appointment, you will
make Mike Donahue welcome in the communications department."
That remark, which seemed entirely innocent, was characterised by
Ms Stansfield in her evidence as:
"a
disgraceful suggestion - implying that I would take out my displeasure
with her on (the new design assistant)".
Ms Stansfield was not satisfied with Miss Easton's last response
and as a consequence she issued her Originating Application in the
Tribunal on 20 October 1999, claiming sex discrimination and naming
Miss Easton as an individual Respondent along with her employers,
the PCS Union. The grievance which had been taken out against Ms
Stansfield by Ms Bryce in July was examined by Miss Easton who told
us in evidence that she had carried out an initial investigation.
The problem which she faced was that Ms Bryce came from a different
union from that of Ms Stansfield and therefore it was not possible
to follow a single procedure which would be applicable to both parties.
At the request of Hugh Lanning Miss Easton did interview Ms Stansfield
and other staff members between 20 July and 2 August 1999. On that
date she sent a memorandum to Ms Bryce with copies to Mr McAuslan
and Ms Stansfield as follows:
"Investigation
of Formal Complaint I have now concluded the investigation into
your formal complaint. I shall be reporting my findings to Jim
McAuslan when he returns from leave next Monday."
(xvii) Mr McAuslan was due to return from leave on 9 August but
by that time Miss Easton told us that she had heard from another
witness to the incident, Ms Stansfield's secretary Evelyn Bloomberger
who, having first said she did not wish to be involved, had contacted
Miss Easton to say that she would give a statement but only after
she had had some hospital treatment and also only in the presence
of her union representative. Miss Easton therefore deferred sending
the papers to Mr McAuslan and was not able to interview Miss Bloomberger
until 2 September 1999. Nothing was done by Miss Easton after that
date and as Ms Stansfield heard nothing further about it for months,
she assumed, as she says in her witness statement, that the matter
was closed. A careful reading of Miss Easton's memorandum of 2 August
1999 does not support that assumption, neither does the fact that
Ms Stansfield mentioned it again in her memorandum to Barry Reamsbottom
of 6 October, quoted above. In her evidence to the Tribunal Miss
Easton said that the reason that she took no action was because
she knew that a new PCS grievance procedure was being negotiated
and would hopefully be resolved by the Honorary Officers in September.
It was intended that those procedures would supersede and replace
all previous procedures and would be applicable to all staff. The
procedures were finally agreed on 8 December 1999 and were circulated
to all staff in a published briefing of that date.
(xviii) The day before
Miss Easton circulated that information to staff she received from
Nikola Bryce a memorandum containing a further complaint about Ms
Stansfield and Terry Collins. That complaint related to events which,
according to Ms Bryce's memorandum, took place between 22 October
and 4 November 1999. Ms Bryce initially went to see Jim McAuslan
about it and he suggested that "we could try and resolve this situation
through dialogue". Ms Bryce had a meeting with Mr Collins on 9 November
which according to Ms Bryce was not productive. Nevertheless she
waited until 7 December, some four weeks later, before lodging a
formal complaint against Ms Stansfield and Mr Collins, requesting
that that complaint be added to her earlier complaint against Ms
Stansfield which was as yet unresolved but in hand".
(xix) Following receipt
of the additional complaint from Nikola Bryce Miss Easton wrote
to Ms Stansfield on 10 December as follows:
"Formal Grievance
I write to inform you that the formal grievance that Nikola
Bryce registered against you and for which I carried out the
initial investigatory interviews, has now been passed to Mike
King, Senior National Officer (Leeds Office) to complete. This
is under the PCS Grievance Procedure (Section 5.1-5.3).
The procedure
allows for you to be given an opportunity to express you (sic)
views about the matter and I expect that Mike will be contacting
you.
Ms Stansfield said in evidence, and we accept it since it was confirmed
by Miss Easton and Mr Lanning, that the person who is the subject
of the grievance is not given a copy of the grievance. We find this
extraordinary and neither Mr Lanning nor Miss Easton could answer
the Chairman's question as to how a person could possibly be expected
to "express views about the matter" if they did not know what "the
matter" was. Indeed Ms Stansfield told the Tribunal that until she
saw a copy of Ms Bryce' s second complaint of 7 December 1999 in
the Trial Bundle, she had no idea that there was a second complaint
and believed that the only complaint in respect of which there was
a formal grievance was that which Ms Bryce had registered in July
1999. In view of the fact that Ms Stansfield had instituted Tribunal
proceedings she decided, on legal advice, not to co-operate with
Miss Easton or Mr King in relation to the grievance.
(xx) On 22 December 1999
Ms Stansfield wrote to the Joint General Secretaries complaining
about the fact that "a further investigation is to be undertaken,
this time by Mike King, after Joan Easton had written to her in
August saying that the complaint made by Nikola Bryce 'had been
completed'. She asked:
"whether
it is appropriate to reopen this matter which both Nikola and
myself had been advised had been finalised".
As commented above, that was a misinterpretation by Ms Stansfield
of what Joan Easton had written on 2 August. Miss Easton replied
to Mr Reamsbottom's query about the matter by memorandum dated 7
January 2000 in which she stated as follows:
a) Val is
not subject to 'double jeopardy' on the same grievance
b) It was
raised, investigated but not dealt with in August/September
c) There
was not a single procedure that covered both the aggrieved and
the aggriever at that time However as it was necessary that
some action was taken when the grievance was first raised, the
AGS asked me to conduct an initial investigation
d) As soon
as the PCS policy was agreed, copies of the initial interviews
that I conducted were passed to Mike King to continue and conclude
the investigation (a manager of equivalent status, where the
matter concerns a grievance against a line manager).
e) Jim McAuslan
has not seen any of the papers of the investigation. My report
to Jim was to inform him that I had conducted most (but not
all) of the interviews and to discuss how we should next proceed
bearing in the mind the lack of policy covering both persons.
It was decided that I should finish the interviews (which I
was not able to do until September) and use the PCS policy,
as the most sensible and practical solution, when it became
available.
f) Nicky
and her GMB representative were advised of this and were agreeable
to wait. Hugh wrote to Val also suggesting that the matter be
concluded as set out in the new procedure."
The last point, paragraph f), is incorrect since Mr Lanning wrote
to Ms Stansfield about her complaint against Joan Easton. It had
nothing to do with Nikki Bryce's complaint against Ms Stansfield,
so Ms Stansfield had no reason to believe that the Bryce complaint
was still live, until she received Joan Easton's memo of 10 December.
Mr Reamsbottom was not satisfied with Joan Easton's reply and wrote
back to her on 17 January 2000 with further comments and questions.
Having made various points he observed:
"I
am also concerned at how apparently restarting an investigation
after Val submitted a complaint to an employment tribunal might
look. Can you comment on the apparent risk of our being accused
of victimisation, of resurrecting a complaint only after an application
had been made to an employment tribunal?"
(xxi) Surprisingly, Miss Easton did not reply to that memo until
8 March 2000, by which time the grievance has been adjudicated upon
by Mike King. Meanwhile, Ms Stansfield presented her second Originating
Application on 7 March 2000 claiming victimisation, on the basis
that "the decision to reactivate the grievance amounts to less favourable
treatment, and that it has occurred because of my first complaint".
(xxii) Prior to the presentation
of the second IT1 Ms Stansfield's solicitors wrote to the Respondents'
solicitors on 18 February referring to two posts that they maintained
were filled as a result of an interview panel which included two
line managers. These were (a) the post of library assistant (Grade
PS3) for which the interview was held on 11 August 1999. The panel
members were the library manager, the Head of Research and others
and (b) the post of research assistant (Grade PS2) for which the
interview date was 1 October 1999. This was decided by a panel comprising
the Head of Research, the Deputy General Secretary and others. The
Respondents' solicitors replied on 29 March 2000 pointing out that
the library post was that of a librarianship trainee, and that trainee
posts are subject to a separate arrangement under Section 4 of the
Respondents' Recruitment and Selection Policy, the composition of
the panel depending upon the training topic. They also explained
that the research officer post was a temporary post at PS2 and they
confirmed that the panel included the Deputy General Secretary and
the Head of Research. Another person who would have sat was exempted
because of involvement in a race discrimination complaint. The Respondents'
witnesses sought to argue that where a temporary post was being
filled, there was less risk of error in recruitment and less stringency
in the formal recruitment procedures.
4 The Law
Sex Discrimination
Section 1 of the Sex Discrimination
Act 1975 provides that:
"(1)
A person discriminates against a woman in any circumstances relevant
for the purposes of any provision of this Act if -
(a)
on the ground of her sex he treats her less favourably than
he treats or would treat a man".
Section 6 provides that:
"(2)
It is unlawful for a person, 'in the case of a woman employed
by him at an establishment in Great Britain, to discriminate against
her
(b)
by dismissing her or subjecting her to any other detriment".
Section 41 deals with employer's liability for the acts of their
employees in the course of their employment. Such liability is to
be construed more widely than in tort and is a question of fact
in every case.
It is well established
law that the Tribunal must make its findings of primary fact on
the evidence before it. The burden of proving facts which are alleged
by the Applicant lies on that Applicant. She has to prove those
facts on the balance of probabilities, as to whether any discriminatory
action or treatment shown by the primary facts has been taken on
the grounds of her sex and is therefore unlawful.
The proper approach to
the claim of direct discrimination was set out by the Court of Appeal
in the leading case of King v Great Britain-China Centre,
which has been recently reaffirmed by the House of Lords in Glasgow
City Council v Zafar. In summary:
(a) the burden
is on the Applicant to prove her case on the balance of probabilities;
(b) it is
unusual to find direct evidence of sex discrimination. Few employers
are prepared to admit it, even to themselves;
(c) the outcome
of the case will therefore generally depend on what inferences
it is proper to draw from the primary facts;
(d) a finding
of discrimination (i.e. less favourable treatment) and a difference
of sex will often point to the possibility of sex discrimination.
In such circumstances the Tribunal will look to the employer
for an explanation. If no explanation if put forward, or the
Tribunal considers the explanation to be inadequate or unsatisfactory,
then it is legitimate for the Tribunal to infer that the discrimination
was on the ground of sex.
Victimisation
This is covered in section
4 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and provides that:
"A person
(the discriminator) discriminates against another person (the
person victimised) in any circumstances relevant for the purposes
of any provision of this Act if he treats the person victimised
less favourably than in those circumstances he treats or would
treat other persons, and does so by reason that the person
victimised has
(a) brought
proceedings against the discriminator or any other person under
this Act, ..."
In the recent case
of Nagarajan v London Regional Transport, the House
of Lords examined the question of victimisation and concluded, by
a majority, that a person could be victimised by a discriminator
who was "consciously or subconsciously" influenced by the fact that
he had brought proceedings against the discriminator.
5 Closing Submissions
Both representatives submitted
detailed written closing submissions and addressed the Tribunal
briefly about them.
Respondents' closing
submissions: Having re-stated the law, with reference to the
well-known cases of King v Great Britain-China Centre
[1991] IRLR 513, Nagarajan v London Regional Transport [1999]
IRLR 572 and Zafar v Glasgow City Council [1998] IRLR
36, Mr Cavalier went through the evidence and the decisions
to withdraw Ms Stansfield from the interview panels. As regards
the Design Manager panel, the decision was that of Mr Lanning and
not Miss Easton. The Design Assistant post panel had also been agreed
in advance of the final procedure and there was no dispute as to
the outcome of the selection process. Mr Cavalier also compared
the three posts designated by the Applicant as comparators and said
that in each case they were temporary posts where different procedures
applied and were therefore not comparable. He also stated that there
was an explanation for the composition of the other panels which
was a reasonable explanation and not tainted with sex discrimination.
As to the grievance, Mr Cavalier pointed to the fact that the grievance
which Ms Stansfield had taken out against Joan Easton was also not
resolved and while the treatment of the grievances was not satisfactory;
there was no less favourable treatment in relation to her case than
that of Miss Easton. There was no evidence that any delay in progressing
the grievances was motivated or caused by discrimination. He also
observed that there was no link in time between the first Tribunal
complaint, lodged on 20 October 1999, and the memorandum sent by
Joan Easton on 10 December 1999. The complaints could equally be,
and in fact were, made by Terry Collins in relation to the grievance
against him and there is no question of less favourable treatment
of the Applicant when compared to Terry Collins. Finally, he observed
that Ms Stansfield had never suggested to Joan Easton that she believed
she had been subjected to sex discrimination and that the complaints
which Ms Stansfield made to Mr Reamsbottom contained no such allegation,
even though that memorandum was sent only a matter of two weeks
before Ms Stansfield lodged her first complaint with the Tribunal.
Applicant's closing
submissions: Mr Thacker repeated the legal principles involved
and also quoted the same authorities as had Mr Cavalier. As to the
evidence, Mr Thacker contrasted the manner in which Ms Stansfield
gave her evidence in a clear and forthright way, with that of the
Respondents and in particular Miss Easton, who was vacillating and
timid. He suggested that it was Miss Easton's timid nature which
somehow endeared her to the Respondents, who preferred her more
compliant approach to that of Ms Stansfield who was very positive
and direct. He submitted that the Respondents had displayed their
"inability to fairly treat an applicant who does not conform to
their stereotypical expectations of how a woman should behave in
a male-dominated workplace". He submitted that the Respondents had
conceded that the procedures applied to the two interview panels
did not follow the allegedly agreed procedures, and he drew attention
to the fact that Mr McAuslan acknowledged that several mistakes
had been made by him and by Miss Easton in the manner in which they
dealt with the Design Assistant post.
6 Conclusions
(i) Ms Stansfield is claiming
sex discrimination under her first Originating Application submitted
on 20 October 1999 and victimisation under her second Originating
Application submitted on 7 March 2000.
Sex Discrimination Claim
(ii) Ms Stansfield's claim
relates to her removal from two interview panels which had been
established for the appointment of the Design Manager and Design
Assistant in her department. We have looked at the manner in which
this was achieved and in particular as to whether Ms Stansfield
can complain of any less favourable treatment. The panel which eventually
selected the Design Manager was composed of two men and two women.
The panel for the Design Assistant was composed of two men (including
the immediate line manager) and one woman.
(iii) The reason why the
Applicant was removed from the first panel was mainly because the
procedures for selecting panel members had not been finalised and
Mr Hugh Lanning wanted to avoid any objection which might have been
taken to the make-up of the panel. There was also a consideration
that because the Applicant was the subject of a grievance taken
out by Nikola Bryce, one of the candidates, this could be seen as
presenting a problem. Both Joan Easton and Jim McAuslan said that
this would have been a factor if the procedural objection had not
been present. We heard other reasons why Ms Stansfield's position
on the interview panel was withdrawn such as the fact that her own
job as Publications Manager had not yet been confirmed and Mr McAuslan
stated (for the first time before the Tribunal) that he had design
experience which Ms Stansfield lacked and for that reason he felt
that he was better qualified to sit on the panel than she was.
(iv) The Design Assistant
post was chosen by a panel which was constituted in accordance with
the procedure. It was insensitive to tell Ms Stansfield that she
was on the panel and then take a decision (presumably by Joan Easton)
to remove her and not inform her directly. As in the Design Manager
post panel, Ms Stansfield had to learn of her removal from the Design
Assistant panel from a third party.
(v) Ms Stansfield asks
us to look at a number of comparators - jobs where a line manager
such as herself was on the selection panel in circumstances where
she was withdrawn. There were three such posts and in each case
we are satisfied that they were temporary appointments and there
were circumstances why the line manager or someone equivalent to
Ms Stansfield was appointed as a member of those panels. We do not
consider that any of the three posts in question are direct comparisons
and they do not assist us in coming to a conclusion of less favourable
treatment. We entirely accept that Ms Stansfield could have sat
on the panel for the Design Assistant's job but the Respondents
chose not to allow her to do so. We ask ourselves why not. We conclude
that the main reason was a personality clash between Joan Easton,
as Director of Personnel, and Ms Stansfield, but that reason had
nothing to do with Ms Stansfield's sex. We are not saying that because
Joan Easton was a woman she could not have discriminated against
Ms Stansfield on such grounds, but having heard the evidence of
both women, we do not draw an inference of sex discrimination as
Miss Easton's motive for excluding Ms Stansfield from the interview
panel.
(vi) We examined very carefully
the suggestion made by Mr Thacker in his closing submissions that
the Respondents were influenced by the way in which Ms Stansfield
reacted to her removal from the interview panels, in a manner which
did not conform to the Respondent's stereotype of how a woman should
behave in a male-dominated workplace. We agree with Mr Thacker's
characterisation of the way in which Ms Stansfield and Miss Easton
gave their evidence, but we do not accept the conclusion that he
would have us draw from that comparison. On the contrary, if we
had felt that Miss Easton, who is a named Respondent in these proceedings,
had been a more positive and efficient manager, we might have been
persuaded that she did intend to discriminate against Ms Stansfield
in engineering her withdrawal from the interview panels, or by "reactivating"
the Bryce grievance. However, our view of Miss Easton confirmed
to us that she is not a person who was capable of acting in that
way. We suspect that her performance before this Tribunal reflects
her general management style arid that it was because of her vacillation
and procrastination that matters were allowed to slip in the way
that they did. During the course of her cross-examination the Chairman
suggested to Miss Easton that perhaps she might have been content
to sit on Ms Bryce's grievance, hoping that it would go away, or
at least be forgotten about, or even that she had forgotten about
it. Miss Easton accepted that those might have been possibilities.
Mr McAuslan took a more positive line, believing that things had
got better and that there was no need to disturb a situation if
it was improving of its own volition. We therefore conclude that
Miss Easton's lack of action in relation to the Nikki Bryce grievance,
was due to inertia and procrastination on her part and it was only
when Ms Bryce submitted a further grievance, at a time when the
new procedures were available, that Miss Easton was obliged to take
action. That action was not, in our judgement, in any way provoked
by the fact that Ms Stansfield had carried out a protected act under
section 2 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, namely the commencement
of proceedings against the Respondents some two months earlier.
(vii) It is instructive
to see the comment made by Terry Collins about Joan Easton's management
style, in a memo which he sent to Barry Reamsbottom, Joint General
Secretary of the Union, on 6 October 1999:
"In
conclusion I have been given the impression throughout this entire
exercise that the Director of Personnel has, from start to finish,
adopted an attitude which seems contradictory. On the one hand
she has said that the main responsibility for appointments rests
with line managers of the area where the vacancy arises, with
Personnel there to advise. On the other hand she has overruled
our agreed decisions on the composition of the panel and the sift.
While I accept that she has a role to play, it seems to me that
the views and the needs of the communications Department were
almost secondary to her desire to have things done her way, without
explaining what advantages her way offered."
This criticism is made by a man, and in our view it had nothing
to do with gender discrimination. We bear in mind the guidance given
to tribunals in the case of Zafar v Glasgow City Council
[1998] IRLR 36, -
"If
the Tribunal considers the explanation to be inadequate or unsatisfactory
it will be legitimate for it to infer that the discrimination
was on racial grounds".
This applies to cases of race or sex discrimination and it is too
high to put the matter by saying that such an inference should
be drawn. We therefore decline to make the inference. Our view is
reinforced by the fact that when Ms Stansfield raised a grievance
against Joan Easton on 6 October 1999 she did not mention sex discrimination
as such, even by inference. Neither does she do so in her letter
of 7 October, addressed to Joan Easton personally, in which she
makes a number of bitter accusations against her. The burden is
on the Applicant to show that she was a victim of sex discrimination
and based on the evidence which we have heard and seen in this Tribunal,
we find on the balance of probabilities that she has failed to demonstrate
sex discrimination in the way she was treated by the Respondents.
Victimisation
(viii) We are satisfied
that Ms Stansfield did not seriously think that the Nikki Bryce
grievance had been resolved. That is apparent from the comments
in her memo of 6 October. However, she could be forgiven for believing
that it had, in view of the long delay in which nothing was said
or done. Again, having heard the evidence of the Respondents, we
are satisfied that the reason for 'sitting on Nikki Bryce's claim'
was a combination of inertia and incompetence on the part of the
Respondents. Jim McAuslan's evidence was that he thought that the
atmosphere in the department had improved to a point where the original
grievance might resolve itself% Two things happened to shatter that
hope. Firstly, the Grievance Procedure was finally and formally
approved and published to all staff on 8 December 1999. Secondly,
and coincidentally, Ms Bryce sent a long memo to Joan Easton on
7 December raising additional complaints, mainly against Terry Collins
but also mentioning Ms Stansfield. Because of that, Joan Easton
had no excuse for further procrastination and she was forced to
take action under the Grievance Procedure which was now available
to her. She did so on 10. December. Once she had passed the papers
to Mike King, the procedure took its course and there was no further
less favourable treatment of Ms Stansfield, bearing in mind that
Mr Collins was also subject to the same procedure at the same time.
(ix) We therefore conclude
that the revival of the Nikki Bryce grievance in December 1999 was
not as a result or consequence of Ms Stansfield's application to
the Employment Tribunal in October. There was in our view no connection
between the two acts and we make no finding of victimisation against
the Respondents.
(x) While we have found
that the Respondents in this case have not committed acts of sex
discrimination or victimisation against Ms Stansfield, as she has
claimed, we do deprecate the way in which grievances have been allowed
to drag on without resolution, the way in which Ms Stansfield was
informed, or rather not informed, of the decisions relating to her
position on the interview panels, matters which were of considerable
importance to her in relation to her status within the union, and
generally the inefficient manner in which important decisions were
made and arrived at. Let us hope that as a result of this case the
senior officers of the union will take note and seek to avoid a
repetition of these events. The claims against both Respondents
are dismissed.
| |
Chairman
DECISION SENT
TO THE PARTIES ON 16 AUG 2000
AND ENTERED IN
THE REGISTER
16 AUG 2000
FOR SECRETARY
OF THE TRIBUNALS
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